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Introduction
The Ministry of Health and Sanitation of Sierra Leone has stipulated minimum staffing levels for all public health facility levels based on the Basic Package of Essential Health Services (BPEHS) 1 . An observational study published in 2017 following the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak reported alarming human resource deficits in public health facilities in Kailahun district of rural Sierra Leone 2 . Of 805 recommended medical staff, the deficit was 501 (62%) and hovered over 50% at all levels of health facilities. Similarly, of 569 recommended non-medical staff, the deficit was 524 (92%). The overarching message was that to meet the BPEHS 1 standards, the Government would need to attract an additional 1,026 workers to Kailahun district over the period 2016-2020 (roughly 256 additional workers per annum).
The post-Ebola period presented an opportunity for the Government of Sierra Leone to devise a health services investment plan. This included a robust investment in human resources for health with a 2020 target for scale up of the BPEHS 3 . Both medical and non-medical staff are essential to maintain service delivery standards, including infection prevention and control practices, and both these staff cadres are included. The shortage in non-medical staff was found to have major implications for maintaining essential services related to infection prevention and control (IPC), such as screening and triage, health facility and personal hygiene as well as waste management 2 .
Three years have now passed since the end of the Ebola outbreak and the operational question is "what has changed" in terms of progress towards achieving BPEHS standards.
Among all public health facilities in Kailahun district of Sierra Leone and in relation to BPEHS standards, we thus assessed staffing levels (medical and non-medical) one month before the onset of the Ebola outbreak, during the last month of the outbreak, and 16 months thereafter.
Methods
This was a comparative cross-sectional study using programme data. The study setting has been described before 2 4 , and this has been a major barrier in increasing staff numbers in relation to the BPEHS.
The study population included all health workers in these health facilities. We disaggregated staff deficits by medical and nonmedical staff (for a full list see Table 5 & Table 6 of Squire et al. 2017) 2 . We assessed staffing levels at 16 months post-Ebola (March 2017), and compared to previously reported staffing levels for pre-Ebola (April 2014) and the end of the outbreak (November 2015) 1 .
April 2014 was immediately prior to the Ebola outbreak and thus representative of the human resource situation before the outbreak. November 2015 was the month when Sierra Leone was declared Ebola-free, and thus representative of the end-situation after Ebola. March 2017 was selected because the revised BPEHS was launched two years prior to this date, and some progress should have been expected.
Data variables were sourced from the monthly district staff list (District Health Information Systems; DHIS2) and the Human Resource Management Information System. Deficits in staffing levels were derived by subtracting the actual levels from the stipulated levels.
Ethics approval was obtained from the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Board (dated 18 December 2018) and the Union Ethics Advisory Group (International Union against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, Paris, France; UAG number 71/18). Since anonymized programme data were used, the requirement for informed consent was waived. Table 1 shows the medical staffing levels in relation to BPEHS standards. Of 805 recommended medical staff during the pre-Ebola and intra-Ebola periods, deficits were 539 (67%) and 528 (65%) respectively. During the post-Ebola period, a total of 815 medical staff were recommended, but the deficit was 490 (60%; a 5% improvement over the intra-Ebola period). When
Results

Amendments from Version 1
We have amended the manuscript based on feedback from peer review. These amendments include additional descriptions of the following: investments in human resources for health by the Government of Sierra Leone; the implications of non-medical staff on maintaining infection prevention and control measures; processes related to training, hiring, and financing of health care workers; and barriers to increasing staff numbers. Finally, we included two additional references to support the above additions.
Any further responses from the reviewers can be found at the end of the article 3 The overall recommended numbers of staff as per the BPEHS increased from 805 during the pre-and intra-Ebola period to 815 in the post-Ebola period as one new facility was added in the post-Ebola period. 4 Similarly, during the post-Ebola period, 5 MCHPs were upgraded to CHPs increasing the staffing requirement for the CHPs from 240 to 265.
stratified by health facility levels, human resource gaps ranged between 31% and 71%. Table 2 shows non-medical staffing levels in relation to BPEHS standards. The overall deficit remained the same at the three time-points. Of 569 recommended non-medical staff during pre-and post-Ebola, the deficits were 526 (92%) and 525 (92%), respectively. During the post-Ebola period, of 574 recommended non-medical staff, the deficit was 528 (92%).
By March 2017 and well into the post-Ebola period, a total of 1,389 health worker positions (medical and non-medical) were recommended by BPEHS, but only 371 (27%) were filled, resulting in an overall human resource deficit of 1,018 (73%).
Discussion
This is the first study assessing staffing levels (medical and non-medical) 16 months into the post-Ebola period and comparing the status with pre-and intra-Ebola periods. The situation remains alarming with a 60% deficit for medical and 92% deficit for non-medical staff. We need to reiterate our earlier urgent call for bold policies and donor support that goes beyond "business as usual." 5 In addition to enhancing staff training, further action could include rapid mobilization of financial resources for employment of non-medical and support staff, including those currently out of public service and reinstatement of retired medical personnel still fit enough to work 2 . Importantly the macro-economic restrictions on the wage bill imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) hamper recruitment and adequate salary levels 4 . 3 The overall recommended numbers of staff as per the BPEHS increased from 569 during the pre-and intra-Ebola period to 574 in the post-Ebola period as one new facility was added in the post-Ebola period. 4 Similarly, during the post-Ebola period, 5 MCHPs were upgraded to CHPs increasing the staffing requirement for the CHPs from 288 to 318.
These need to be boldly tackled. Whether or not the BPEHS standards are realistic and adaptation thereof may also need consideration.
The strengths of the study are that we included all district public health facilities, all human resource cadres and similar data prior to, during and after the outbreak. The main limitation is that we might have excluded some staff not on regular payrolls (those working on a volunteer basis), although we believe this is unlikely to offset or negate our study findings.
There are two key messages from this study. First, at the current rate of 5% improvement in the medical staff deficit over the 16-month post-Ebola period (65% intra-Ebola to 60% post-Ebola), it will take an additional 12 years to achieve BPEHS standards -too little, too slow! Second, the persistent 92% gap for non-medical staff has major implications for future Ebola and infectious disease outbreaks 6 . Essential services for infection prevention and control at health facilities and the implementation of personal hygiene measures and effective waste management depend on nonmedical staff. In the unfortunate event of a new Ebola outbreak, the current scenario would result in a déjà vu of high transmission among health workers and the community at large 7 . Ending the restrictive wage bill 4 is vital to mobilize the needed financial resources and rapidly employ and deploy staff.
In conclusion, with an overall health worker deficit of 1,018, 16 months into the post-Ebola period compared to a deficit of 1,026 during the Ebola outbreak, "nothing has really changed." We reiterate our call for strong political will, international collaboration, generous funding and a change in hiring restrictions imposed by the IMF. 
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This paper has not undergone many changes from the original version.
It has some added material in the introduction regarding the immediate post-Ebola period as an opportunity to fix the human resource deficit.
The methods section has some material describing the healthcare human resources development pathway and states that the major obstacle is insufficient financial resources largely due to restriction imposed by the IMF. The cited reference, which, in fairness, did appear in the previous version as well, does support this, though it dates from 2007, and so the reader must assume that the current fiscal policy environment has not changed. As the paper's major recommendation is a reversal of IMF policy, some confirmation that this is still the major obstacle to Sierra Leone's healthcare human resources meeting the country's goals would be welcome if such a reference is available.
The paper now has a sentence directing readers to the authors' previous work for more information on the details of the staffing shortfalls. A quick examination of the two tables mentioned does prove interesting. For example, the 92% of the 92% non-medical staff shortfall comes from just the cleaners and security officers. As the authors mention the consequences of insufficient waste management staff, and it would help the reader to have presented at least the quantification of the shortfall for this category to support their argument in this paper, as it would seem quite relevant.
No competing interests were disclosed.
Competing Interests:
Reviewer Expertise: Epidemiology, filovirus outbreak management, public health I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard. The paper would benefit from some additional exploration of not meeting this standard. The authors speculate about the consequences of the severe non-medical under-staffing in terms of being unable to cope with infectious disease outbreaks because of insufficient hygiene staff, but at a 92% deficit of "administrative staff, cleaners, cooks, maintenance workers, drivers, and security personnel" (and this list should perhaps appear somewhere in the body of the paper and not just in a footnote to table 2), the day to day consequences should go well beyond this.
The reader might also profit from some information about why the gap has persisted. The recommendation to mobilize additional financial resources suggests that the underlying problem is insufficient funding, which seems reasonable, but the foundation for this recommendation is never laid by any mention of what has caused the gap to remain. Perhaps the money is available but the qualified people are in the middle of their training programs? Other problems could be at work as well, but the authors do not explore this next logical step following from their findings.
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature? Partly
Is the study design appropriate and is the work technically sound? Partly
Are sufficient details of methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others? Yes
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate? Yes
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility? Yes
Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results? No
Competing Interests:
Reviewer Expertise: Human resource for health and Skin NTD I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however I have significant reservations, as outlined above. Dear Dr Wendemagegn Enbiale, Thank you for your review and insightful comments on the manuscript. We have responded to each of your points below. 1. Reviewer comment 1. Health Workforce (HWF) staffing usually measured based on population and there are international standards for developing countries. Why the authors are not interested to use or at least mention that? Response: Thank you for this comment. The Basic Package for Essential Health Services (BPEHS) is the national standard used to guide health workforce requirements in Sierra Leone. Despite the existence of global methods usually using a population-based measure the BPEHS has been adapted to the Sierra Leone content and thus more appropriate to measure health workforce gaps. In particular, the BPEHS allows us to quantify the real gap between the Government's commitment and the actual status in terms of staffing. In addition, the international standard for staffing measures focus only on clinical staff. However, in the Ebola and post-Ebola context, non-clinical staffing are equally essential, especially in terms of infection prevention and control measures. Therefore, the use of the BPEHS is more appropriate as it allows assessment of both medical and non-medical staff cadres. In the introduction, we have added more explanation and references to clarify our stand to use the BPEHS as the yardstick in the introduction. We have also added more information of the BPEHS standard in the methods section. 2. Reviewer Comment 2: What is the catchment population of those health facilities and what is the health workforce staffing deficit based on the WHO criteria (for a developing country)? Response: This study is focused on a specific district, Kailahun and all health facilities in the district was included. Details of the Study setting and population was already reported in the previous paper for which
